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REVIEW ESSAY
MEN IN THE PLACE OF WOMEN, FROM BUTLER TO LITTLE
SISTERS©
GAY MALE PORNOGRAPHY"AN ISSUE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION. BY CHRISTOPHER N. KENDALL
(VANCOUVER: UBC PRESS, 2004) 270 pages.'
BY LESLIE GREEN

2

I.
In their anti-pornography ordinance, Andrea Dworkin and
Catharine MacKinnon proposed that: "Pornography shall mean the
graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or
in words."3 That is obviously a stipulation for a legislative purpose. It
does not capture the ordinary meaning of "pornography," for whether
pornography subordinates women is not something that is true by
definition. No one is seriously tempted to reply to the question, "Does
pornography really subordinate women?" with the bare assertion, "Yes,
or else it wouldn't count as pornography." The issue turns on matters of
fact and morality, not semantics. Moreover, on the ordinary view,
pornography does not necessarily involve women. Most people think
that graphic, sexually explicit images of men may also be pornographic.
Here, however, we need to be attentive. Notice that the DworkinMacKinnon definition does not require that pornography actually be
pictures of women or stories about women; its gender essentialism is
© 2005, L. Green.
1

[GayMale Pornograph].
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School and Department of Philosophy, York University;
Visiting Professor, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
2

' Andrea Dworkin & Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornographyand Civil Rights: A New Day
for Women's Equality(Minneapolis,MN: Organizing Against Pornography, 1988) at 113 [Dworkin
& MacKinnon, Pornography]. This is a necessary condition of material being pornographic; the
sufficient conditions are also outlined (ibid. at 113). This wording is taken from the Indianapolis
version of the ordinance; the Model Ordinance and Minneapolis Ordinance vary in minor ways
(ibid.at 101,138).
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functional, not representational. Pornography, they say, is something
that is or causes women's subordination-that is its essence. Whether it
does so by representing women is a purely contingent matter. No doubt
that is the commonest case, but perhaps certain representations of
males also subordinate women. At any rate, that is allowed for by their
further stipulation: "The' 4use of men ... in the place of women shall also
constitute pornography."
Christopher N. Kendall's book, Gay Male Pornography:An Issue
of Sex Discrimination,is a faithful application of those ideas to the law
and politics of two cases. In R. v. Butler,5 the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld criminal penalties on the production, distribution, and public
display of obscene materials, and on their possession for any of those
purposes. Obscenity could be banned, the court said, to the extent that it
is harmful, and in particular, harmful to Women. In Little Sisters Book
and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice)6 the Court upheld
Canada Customs' power to seize and ban the importation of obscene
materials, including lesbian and gay male pornography, which it held to
be subject to exactly the same analysis as heterosexual pornography. It
agreed with the courts below that recent customs seizures had in fact
been disgracefully biased and homophobic, but by a majority of six to
three held that the legislation under which the customs officers acted
was sound and that the injustices were largely due to poor
administration.
Butler has been a puzzling decision. The Court said that the
Charterof Rights and Freedoms prohibits Parliament from criminalizing
obscenity in order to enforce community moral standards-that would
be legal moralism-but it affirmed Parliament's power to do so in order
to prevent social harm, and in particular the harm of inequality between
men and women. Many who thought that was an attractive principle
were stunned by the Court's further assertion that that is what Canada's
obscenity laws actually do. Section 163(8) of the Criminal Code contains
two independent definitions of obscenity. The less controversial is: any
publication a dominant aspect of which is "sex and any one or more of

'Ibid at 114. 1 have elided the words "children, or transsexuals."
5 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [Butleii.
6[2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 [Little Sisters].
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the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence ....
"I
One can imagine how that might be aimed at preventing harms, and that
definition rarely attracted complaint. But section 163(8) of the Code
also makes it a sufficient condition of criminal obscenity that a
publication has as its dominant characteristic "the undue exploitation of
sex." That definition, which had over the years proved quite supple, was
in its history, text, and application shot through with moralism. In fact,
the whole section appears under the heading "Offences Tending to
Corrupt Morals," along with the related crimes of publicly exhibiting a
disgusting object, and "advertis[ing] or publish[ing] an advertisement of
any means, instructions, medicine, drug or article intended or
represented as a method for restoring sexual virility or curing venereal
diseases or diseases of the generative organs."8 This 1959 definition of
obscenity was certainly not crafted with an eye to promoting sex
equality, nor had it actually been applied that way. In sustaining the
prohibition on that ground, it seemed that the Court would therefore
have to abandon the doctrine that unconstitutional laws may not be
saved by imputing to them a new and "shifting purpose." 9 Instead, the
Court rejected any conflict between legal moralism and the harm
principle: "[T]he notions of moral corruption and harm to society are
not distinct, as the appellant suggests, but are inextricably linked. It is
moral corruption of a certain kind which leads to the detrimental effect
on society."1 Lesbians and gay men have long experience with what the
authorities think about "moral corruption," so it was hardly surprising
that many thought that Butler cheated on the Charter's promise to
protect their liberty and equality.
The worry, which Kendall here tries to put to rest, was a familiar
one. In an early defence of their anti-pornography ordinances, Dworkin
and MacKinnon provided a list of questions and answers to reassure the
sceptic. It included the following: "Q: But under the Ordinance, won't
gay and lesbian materials be the first to go?" 11 Their answer was that
representations of homosexual acts would not be illegal per se: "The

'R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
8

Ibid., s. 163(2)(d).

9R.v.Big M Drug MartLtd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 335-36.
'oButler, supra note 5 at 494.
" Dworkin & MacKinnon, Pornography,supra note 3 at 85.
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Ordinance requires proof of actual harm before any materials can be
found illegal. The harm cannot be a moral one .... "2 They even
predicted that it would be unlikely that courts would enforce the
ordinance against same-sex materials, where the lack of a gender
difference would probably blind judges to any harm. If that was a
plausible supposition with respect to civil remedies, it should have been
amply confirmed in the criminal context with its more demanding
standard of proof, and in areas that import the criminal definition of
obscenity. That reassuring hypothesis was decisively refuted by the postButler experience. Lower courts had no difficulty in finding that even the
mildest lesbian and gay pornography involved the undue exploitation of
sex by causing, harm through moral corruption. 3 Customs inspectors
continued their pattern of homophobic seizures, nearly putting out of
business Little Sister's Books and Art Emporium in Vancouver, and
doing serious injury to Glad Day Books in Toronto-much-loved gay
community bookstores that sold pornography only as a minor part of
their trade. Pornography was not the sole target of the obscenity regime.
Books detained because someone decided they might be, or were,
criminally obscene include: Harold Norse, Harold Norse: Love Poems
1940-1985; bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation; Quentin
Crisp, The Naked Civil Servant; and Heinz Heger, The Men With the Pink
Triangle: The True, Life-and-Death Story of Homosexuals in the Nazi
Death Camps. 4 Award-winning novels, children's stories, safer-sex
information, and dreary postmodernist tomes were all swept up when
shipped to gay-identified bookstores. Censorship was followed by selfcensorship. Seeking to avoid trouble, Oxford University Press would not
even distribute Professor Richard Mohr's important work, Gay Ideas:
Outing and Other Controversies.5 Meanwhile, Playboy, Penthouse, and
Hustler remained on prominent display in many a corner store, and
heterosexual pornography popped up uninvited in one's browser and
email. Gay and lesbian materials had indeed been "the first to go."

12

3

Ibid.
GladDay Bookshop Inc. v. Canada(Deputy M.NR.) [19921 O.J. No. 1466 (QL).

14 Janine Fuller & Stuart Blackley, Restricted Entry.- Censorship on Trial (Vancouver:

Press Gang, 1995) at 20-21.
'5 Human Rights Watch (Free Expression Project), A Ruling Inspired by U.S. AntiPornographyActivists is Used to Restrict Lesbian and Gay Publicationsin Canada, HRW Index
No. F601 (February 1994) at 8-9.
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How far was any of this connected to Butler? No one thought the
decision had initiated the anti-gay bias of customs officers, police, and
judges-the sweeping seizures targeting gay bookstores antedated the
decision-but Butler had obviously done nothing to rein it in, and may
even have legitimated it. Before Butler, it was arguable that two of the
courts' main doctrinal tests for what counts as the undue exploitation of
sex-the "community standard of tolerance" test and the "degrading
and dehumanizing" test-would ultimately have to give way or be
qualified if obscenity law was to be purged of moralism. The problem
was not merely the uncertain and unstable relationship between the two,
it was their content. What a national majority regards as tolerable is no
less moralistic than what it regards as virtuous. What people find
degrading or dehumanizing in sex is inextricably bound up with their
ideals of what sex should be. Without very significant modification,
these tests could provide verbal ornaments with which police, customs
officers, and judges would decorate their homophobic prejudices.
Moreover, if some kinds of pornography were in fact harmful, then
Parliament could surely legislate so as to precisely target them-it had
made such efforts in both the hate speech and child pornography laws,
so why not here? These rather obvious worries were not confined to
liberal opinion. Radical feminists, following the lead of MacKinnon, had
argued that criminal regulation of obscenity was a retrograde step in
women's rights: "Men's obscenity is not women's pornography.
Obscenity is more concerned with whether men blush, pornography with
whether women bleed ... ,,16 Obscenity law gives power to the state, not
to the victim, and it is stained with masculinist assumptions about what
is obscene. "The law of obscenity has literally nothing in common with
this feminist critique."' 7 If legal moralism had to end under the Charter,
then the repeal or invalidation of the prohibition on the "undue
exploitation of sex" would nicely mark the beginning of that end.
Bafflingly, the Court simply announced that the obscenity law as
it stood was not moralistic. It seemed to have been particularly
influenced by the arguments of one of the intervenors on the
government's side, the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund
(LEAF), who transmogrified the feminist critique of obscenity law into its
"6Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1989) at 199 [MacKinnon, Feminist TheorI.
17

Ibid.
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main support. Potential harm to women became not a reason to reject
obscenity laws, but rather, a reason to uphold them. It took some
experience with Butler for LEAF to lose its enthusiasm and significantly
qualify that view. In Little Sisters, LEAF intervened on behalf of the
bookstore and, together with civil libertarians and Canada's national
lesbian and gay rights group, Egale Canada Everywhere (Egale), argued
that social context is fundamental, that lesbian pornography's effect on
lesbians may differ from heterosexual pornography's effect on women,
that sexual speech plays a special role in the lives of sexual minorities,
and that a community standard of tolerance is a moralistic one. None of
those arguments found favour with the Court. Perhaps one can
sympathize. In Butler, the Court had tried to be attentive to women's
interests, and now leading feminists were telling it that harm and moral
corruption were, after all, distinct. In other decisions, 8 the Court tried
to advance equality for lesbians and gay men, and now lesbian and gay
lawyers were telling it that equal treatment does not always mean
identical treatment. It must have been too much to take in. The Court
unanimously rejected any criticism of Butler and said the rash of
homophobic decisions had nothing to do with the standards it had laid
down; a majority held that apart from the "reverse onus" provisions
requiring importers to prove that their books were not obscene, the
customs law was in good order as it stood. There had been serious antigay discrimination, but it was all a misunderstanding; everyone should
try harder in future. Kendall agrees with the Court and, with few
qualifications, admires both decisions; his main regret is that they have
not resulted in more criminal convictions.
Kendall's discussion of the political conflicts around the two
cases is informed, lively, and engaged. It is a report from the front lines,
by one who worked with an intervenor supporting the government in
Little Sisters.'9 It is also the record of a family dispute, addressed to other
men who are part of the urban gay subculture to whom, and occasionally
for whom, Kendall purports to speak. It is a reply to "the community's

"8 See e.g. Egan v. Canada,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
" Kendall worked with the local branch of the American-based women's group, Equality
Now, and I consulted briefly with Egale, Canada's national lesbian and gay rights group. As Kendall
notes, Egale's factum adopted some of my earlier arguments about gay male pornography. See
Egale Canada, Factum to the Supreme Court of Canada in the Little Sisters Appeal, online:
< http:/Avww.egale.ca/index.asp?lang= E&menu = &item= 443 >.
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criticism of Butler,"2 a community that he thinks failed to appreciate the
identity between the interests of women and the interests of gay men,
and that was guilty of inconsistency when it opposed the obscenity laws
while welcoming Bill C-250 that added gay people to the list of those
against whom it is an offence wilfully to promote hatred. Where, asks
Kendall, was the exigent demand for proof of harm when what was at
stake was the permissibility of things like bumper stickers urging people
to "Kill a Queer for Christ"? Kendall's assumption that both laws must
stand or fall together may be hasty. One might think that there are
morally relevant differences between magazines that represent men as
sexual playthings and signs that incite people to murder homosexuals.
One might also think that the starkly different character of the broad,
absolute liability obscenity offences and the carefully drafted hate
crimes with their demanding mens rea requirements might support a
different assessment. But Kendall is right that we must somehow bring
our views about pornography and hate speech under plausible and
coherent principles of free expression, and to do that we must address
some fundamental questions about political morality and about the
nature of sexuality.
II.
What exactly does Little Sisters say about gay pornography?
Kendall writes, "[T]he Supreme Court of Canada ruled unanimously ...
that gay male pornography violates the sex equality test for
pornographic harm first set down by the Court in its 1992 decision in R.
v. Butler."21 This is actually quite far from any ruling in Little Sisters.
What the case decided on the point is merely that the Butler test for
criminal obscenity is to be applied without regard to the sex of the
people represented in the materials or to the sex of the audience
reading or viewing them. Little Sisters did not decide that gay male
pornography as a type of expression violates the test for obscenity; it
decided that the test is to be applied without modification in order to
decide whether any particular token of that type violates it.
The "Butler test" purports to replace a moralistic view of
obscenity with one rooted in an assessment of harmfulness: "The courts
2

Kendall, supranote 1 at 4.
1 at xi.

2) Supra note
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must determine as best they can what the community would tolerate
others being exposed to on the basis of the degree of harm that may flow
from such exposure."2 2 As every student of jurisprudence knows, the
intelligibility of the underlying harm principle turns on the account of
"harm" that it deploys. One cannot pretend to be invoking a harm-based
test if one means by "harm" whatever reduces someone's utility, violates
a community's shared morality, causes moral corruption, or gives
offence to the majority.- To count these as harms would collapse into
legal moralism which, according to the Court, is impermissible under
the Charter: "To impose a certain standard of public and sexual
morality, solely because it reflects the conventions of a given
community, is inimical to the exercise and enjoyment of individual
.freedoms ... ."3 How then are we to think of "harm" for the purposes of
obscenity law?
The usual answer is that it consists in those injuries to persons
that criminal and civil law prohibits: assault, rape, exploitation,
discrimination, and so forth. The standard defence of obscenity law
accordingly proceeds in three steps: (1) it argues that the availability of
obscene materials plays a significant role in causing such injuries; (2) it
argues that existing laws against injuring people in these ways,
attempting to do so, or counselling others to do so are inadequate to
prevent such harm; and (3) it argues that banning obscenity achieves this
end at an acceptable cost to other values. Kendall certainly wants to
endorse that familiar claim (though only step (1) attracts serious
discussion in this book). He also wants to insist, as would the fiercest
opponent of censorship, that we must protect people from being
coerced into making or using pornography. Those are fairly
conventional arguments. More striking is his further claim that gay male
pornography is, as his subtitle puts it, "an issue of sex discrimination."
Kendall argues that all gay pornography causes or legitimates harms of
discrimination by shaping gay sexuality in directions infused with
sexualized hatred and self-hatred. It does this by representing, and in
that way promoting and legitimating, bad sex-sex that incorporates or
mimics unequal gender roles, or sex that is non-consensual, violent, or
rough. But those are scarcely the beginning. Also on the index are an

' Butler, supranote 5 at 485.
23

Ibid.at 492.
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24
interest in penetrating or being penetrated during sex, a special
interest in having sex with men of other races, 5 and an interest in having
sex without condoms. 26 Encouraging men to go to bars is also very bad:
"[G]ay men in bars cease to be people. They are denied a human
identity and are instead offered a predetermined sexual identity void of
humanity. ,27 The ways that gay male desire can go wrong seem to be
legion. Kendall is not wholly negative, however; he is also moved by a
positive ideal: "What I long for is a gay male sexuality that includes and
is compassion, sensuality, tenderness, intimacy, inclusive love-making,
and the equality found only in a life-affirming reciprocity ... ,,2 It would
be easy to mock the Hallmark-style sentimentality29 of this view-not to
mention the 'jarring notion of "inclusive love-making" (as if our sexual
desires should be non-discriminatory). But other men share those
longings and, if they are lucky enough in this harsh world, they will find
each other. The hope that animates this book, however, is much more
ambitious. Kendall fervently wants everyone's sexuality to be like that, in
all contexts, all the time-and he is quite willing to use the coercive
power of the state to bring people onside. There is an evident obstacle
to that plan: there is no more prospect of using criminal sanctions to
enforce, say, "inclusive love-making" than there is of using them to
enforce heterosexual love-making. Criminal punishments for
homosexual conduct made no one straight, and criminal punishments
for exclusive love-making would make no one more inclusive. But
Kendall shares the conviction that criminal law can affect our sexuality
indirectly, by removing the obstacles to the kind of sexuality he longs
for. So while he probably wouldn't favour jailing Caucasians who have
sex only with Asians, he is open to jailing those who produce
pornography catering to such non-inclusive, racialized sexual interests.
And why not-isn't a racially exclusive sexuality just the sort of harm

24

Kendall, supra note 1 at 113.

2'Ibid at 123.
26

Ibid.at 146.
Ibid. at 151.

27

2"Ibid.at xix.
29 See Lauren Berlant, "The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics" in W.
Brown & J. Halley, eds., Left Legalism/Left Critique (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002)
105.
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that Parliament is competent to prevent, by criminal sanction if
necessary?
It is not. Contrary to what Kendall supposes, the further malign
consequences that he imputes to gay male pornography are not what the
Court means by "harm." Justice Sopinka writes,
Harm in this context means that it predisposes persons to act in an anti-social manner as,
for example, the physical or mental mistreatment of women by men, or, what is perhaps
debatable, the reverse. Anti-social conduct for this purpose is conduct which society
formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning.3 °

That formulation leaves margins of doubt, but on the core point it is
clear enough: harmful is only such conduct as society has formally
recognized as incompatible with its proper functioning-for instance,
various forms of physical and mental mistreatment. To dispose people
to do harm is therefore to dispose them to mistreat others in ways that
violate rights already protected by criminal and civil law. So even if the
production, use, or display of pornographic materials makes it harder to
universalize a sexuality that is "compassion, sensuality, tenderness,
intimacy [and] inclusive love-making," that will not satisfy the Butler test
for obscenity. It is not unlawful mistreatment to have selfish, rough, or
casual sex. It is not unlawful to be "looks-ist," to be a "body fascist," to
be racially exclusive, or even to seek out "unsafe" sex. It is not unlawful
to cruise bars and thereby, on Kendall's view, to abandon one's
humanity. Whatever the vices of such appetites, they have no more been
formally declared incompatible with society's proper functioning than
has a desire to have sex with someone because you feel sorry for him,
because you find him witty, or because you want to see his smart loft.
It is important to grasp the significance of this: sexual liberty
always makes it harder for some people to realize their sexual desires.
Rapists and pedophiles are among them, of course-in having sex
.without valid consent, they fail to respect the liberty of others. But it
also makes it harder for those who want everyone's sexuality to be like
their own, and it does so even when their ideals are attractive. They are
entitled to seek willing converts, they can demonstrate by example the
superiority of their lives, they may encourage others to join them, but
they may not rely on the strong arm of the law to achieve their goals.
This is the centre of the harm principle. As Mill put it:

30Butler,supra note 5 at 485.

Review Essay

2005]

He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do
so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would
be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct 31from which it is
to some one else.
desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil

To embrace this principle has consequences. Just as religious
fundamentalisms are hampered when apostasy is not a crime, sexual
fundamentalisms are hampered when sexual heresy is not a crime.

HIi.
Another distinctive feature of a harm-based approach to
pornography is its concern that there be actual evidence of the evils that
it causes. Kendall presents no new finding, survey, or experiment that
would make plausible, let alone confirm, his conviction that access to
gay pornography is a significant cause of homophobic discrimination,
gay rape, partner abuse, teen suicide, or HIV infection. But on this score
he is admirably honest. He freely concedes that he has nothing to offer,
and that no one else does either: "[N]o social science data exist on gay
pornography specifically .... "32 One might have anticipated, then, a
short book. Unperturbed, Kendall argues at length that "gay male
33
pornography can be proven harmful by way of analogy." Arming
himself with the epistemology that drove Donald Rumsfeld's hunt for
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, Kendall assumes that an absence of
evidence is not evidence of absence.
That is an unreliable epistemic policy. We need positive
evidence, and we need it at three different points and in three different
forms. First, there is the evidence necessary for constitutionality-the
evidentiary standard a court needs before it can conclude there is a
sufficiently rational connection between Parliament's aims in preventing
harm and the restrictive policy it proposes. Second, there is the evidence
required for political justifiability: the sort of evidence anyonelegislators, voters, commentators-needs before being entitled to

3' John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" in Mary Warnock, ed., Utilitarianism,On Liberty,Essay
on Bentham togetherwith selected writings ofJeremy Bentham and John Austin (London: Collins,
1962) 126 at 135.
32
Supra note 1 at 89.
33

Ibid.at 93.
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conclude as a matter of political morality that the legislature's policy is
wise and just. Third, there is the evidentiary standard for liability-the
sort of evidence a judge and jury need before they may convict on an
obscenity charge. These are different standards, and Butler deals directly
only with the first of them.
On the standard for constitutionality the Court was deferential:
the harmfulness of pornography is controversial, perhaps not even
susceptible of scientific proof, but Parliament is entitled to act on the
basis of a "reasoned apprehension of harm."34 Kendall deplores the fact
that the Court went no further. In contrast to many social scientists, he
thinks that there is overwhelming, conclusive, and indeed "irrebutable
proof of harm" of pornography.35 Be that as it may, the Court's
deference to legislative opinion on this point is entirely appropriate, for
it has neither the expertise nor the legitimacy to pronounce on such
matters.
However, a reasoned apprehension of harm will not suffice
when we turn to the question of justifiability. Even if an obscenity law
would be constitutional, Parliament should not enact it unless it has
persuasive evidence that doing so achieves more good than harm. The
operative distinction is simple enough-it is essentially the difference
between there being a good case for doing something and there being
no good case for others to prevent one from doing it. This distinction is
sometimes missed by lawyers who slide silently from arguments about
legality of a statute, to conclusions about its justice or wisdom.
MacKinnon, for example, writes that Butler held that "[t]he evidence on
the harm of pornography was sufficient for a law against it."'3 6 But the
only sense in which this is true is that the Court thought a reasoned
apprehension of harm is an adequate foundation for the
constitutionality of the law. Had it meant to pronounce on its wisdom,
Justice Sopinka could not have said that obscenity may be prohibited
"because it is perceived by public opinion to be harmful to society."3 7
That is a tolerable, if somewhat loose, formulation of the constitutional
principle that courts should defer to the perceptions of the legislature as
34

Butler,supra note 5 at 467, 504.

35

Supra.note 1 at 4.

36 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1993) at 101.
3

Butler,supra note 5 at 454, 479.
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the authoritative voice of the public. But if read as a suggestion that
adverse public opinion can make some activity harmful and thereby
justify a law as matter of public policy or, worse still, that adverse public
can warrant convicting someone under such a law, it would
opinion
amount to a complete surrender to legal moralism.
Justification is a matter of what laws we should have, not what
laws the legislature has the power to enact. A harm-based justification
needs not only reliable evidence of the harmfulness of obscenity, but
also reliable evidence that censorship prevents this harm at a cost no
greater than the harm it prevents. 38 The harms of criminalization are
plain. There are the penalties and the collateral injuries that flow from
them, to the accused and to others. There are also the costs of applying
and enforcing the laws, including not only administrative costs but also
the opportunity costs of devoting resources to obscenity rather than to
other concerns (a customs officer looking for pornography at the border
could be looking for handguns; a police officer investigating a video
store could be investigating an assault). A defender of criminalization
therefore needs to demonstrate not only the harms of pornography but
also the efficacy of the remedy. The facts in Little Sisters provide one
reason for pause: they evidence a standing temptation to use prior
restraints against unpopular people and views; another is that the status
of women in places like Denmark, which has decriminalized
pornography for a generation, is no worse than it is in Canada or the
United States. There is even evidence that within the United States
gender equality is greater in states that have higher circulation rates of
pornography. 39 The plausible inference is not, I hasten to add, that
pornography improves the status of women; it is that decriminalization
need not harm it, and that a more liberal social order may be associated
both with greater access to pornography and with greater security for
women's rights.
Consider, finally, the role of evidence in the context of criminal
liability. The Butler test requires that obscenity be established on the
basis of the risk of harm, where "harm" means the unlawful

38 This shares the structure of a section 1 analysis under the Charter, but it is free of any
degree of deference, and its aim is to establish the wisdom, and not just the legality, of the
restriction.
39
Larry Baron, "Feminist Perspectives on Sexuality" (1990) 27 J. of Sex Res. 363.
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mistreatment of people. The Court also tried to give some direction
about how that might work out in practice:
[T]he portrayal of sex coupled with violence will almost always constitute the undue
exploitation of sex. Explicit sex which is degrading or dehumanizing may be undue if the
risk of harm is substantial. Finally, explicit sex that is not violent and neither degrading
nor dehumanizing is generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify as the undue
exploitation of sex unless it employs children in its production.'

Notice how this classification works. Harmfulness is a reason for an
obscenity conclusion, not the other way round. Thus, the Court does not
say that if materials are obscene then they are harmful per se. Had it
decided that, we would be no further ahead in knowing what is
criminally obscene. It said that to the extent that material is harmful it is
criminally obscene. Note also the carefully modulated formulations:
representations of sex with violence will "almost always" (not always) be
harmful and therefore obscene; non-violent explicit sex that is
"degrading or dehumanizing" may be obscene when the risk of harm is
substantial-modestly or even moderately harmful materials in this
category may therefore not be obscene. The only materials categorically
banned are those that employ children in their production. Apart from
that solitary class, someone needs to assess the harmfulness of the
materials and on that basis determine whether they are obscene. Who
should that be, and how should they decide?
That does not seem like it ought to be a difficult question. No
offence is committed if the materials in question are not actually
obscene, so it must fall to the judge and jury to determine whether they
are, and the Crown will need to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Butler test says that it is to proceed on the basis of proving their
harmfulness. That is the natural understanding of the matter, and it is
endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Hawkins.4 Kendall,
however, rejects this interpretation. He detects a note of bad faith:
"[T]here is hypocrisy in the claim that, within the context of criminal
laws aimed at controlling systemic inequalities, an incredibly high
standard of proof, and lots of it, must be presented every time the
Crown tries to take concrete action to stop those materials that cause

4 Supra note 5 at 485.
4 [1994] 86 C.C.C. (3d) 246 (Ont. C.A.).
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inequality. 4 2 He thinks that the requirement that the Crown prove its
case creates a legal nightmare, yet this sits uneasily with his assertion
that the harmfulness of pornography has been established
"unequivocally," that the "proof" is "irrebutable."4 3 If that is so, then in
a given case the Crown need only draw on the armoury of these
convincing, unequivocal, irrebutable proofs to establish that the
materials in question are of a sort that is harmful. It is difficult to see
what the alternative could be. It is true that "the Crown could not be
required to adduce a higher level of proof than the subject matter
admits of."' But that cannot mean that the Crown may substitute the
standard of constitutionality in the context of liability. We can't start
convicting people of criminal offences on a "reasoned apprehension"
that they committed a prohibited act, or even on the strength of a fairly
persuasive case. This accords with MacKinnon and Dworkin's view. In
1994 they wrote, "[t]o date one indictment under Butler has been
brought against lesbian sadomasochist material ... . If this magazine is
proven to harm women, including by producing civil inequality, the case
should result in a conviction."45 They did not think that anyone should
be convicted in the absence of proof of harm.
IV.
Kendall's claim is not simply that gay male pornography may be
harmful in some way or other-it is that it is unequivocally harmful, and
that its harm sounds in sex discrimination. How do texts or images that
represent men alone manage this? By using men "in the place of
women." That thesis was provocatively and pungently defended by John
Stoltenberg back in the 1980s, building on some ideas of Andrea
Dworkin's. 6 In its general form, the thought is that even in the absence
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Supra note 1 at 27.
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Ibid.at 4.

4 Little Sisters supra note 6 at 1166.
4 Catharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin, Press Release, "Statement by Catharine
A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin Regarding Canadian Customs and Legal Approaches to
<http://nostatusquo.com/ACLU/dworkin/
online:
1994),
August
(26
Pornography"
OrdinanceCanada.html> [emphasis added].
46 John Stoltenberg, Refusing to be a Man: Essays on Sex and Justice (Portland, OR:
Breitenbush Books, 1989) at 41-56; John Stoltenberg, "Gays and the Propornography Movement:
Having the Hots for Sex Discrimination" in M.S. Kimmel, ed., Men Confront Pornography(New
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of a sex difference there may be a gender difference, provided there is
an eroticized hierarchy to stand in for the opposition of man/woman.
Almost anything will do,-top/bottom, old/young, rich/poor, white/black,
viewer/viewed. (As Danish poet Piet Hein reminds us, topology will
work too: "Everything's either concave or -vex / So whatever you dream
will be something with sex.") 47 Seen though the lens of gender
reductionism, gay male pornography embodies the eroticized hatred of
women. Using it conditions men to hate femininity, whether in women,
in other men, or in themselves, and thus to repeat the harmful
objectification of heterosexual pornography.
The fact that this picture is familiar is no objection. There is
nothing wrong with sticking by a view that is correct; legal and political
theory have often been marred by the compulsion to originality for its
own sake. But there have been at least two developments that warrant
some reconsideration of Stoltenberg's line. First, analytical feminists
now have a fresh account of how it could be true that pornography
subordinates women, an account that does not depend on the crude sort
of Pavlovian conditioning that earlier feminists posited and for which
there is so little reliable evidence.4 8 On this view, it is not that
pornography conditions men to want to rape or abuse women, it is that
it influences everyone's view of the rules of the game in sex. It does not
inspire a taste for sex without consent as much as it shapes general
norms about what counts as consent.
The second development is a more subtle understanding of
sexual objectification. Most ordinary pornography does not in fact
consist of the images of violence, butchery, and torture that obsessed the
old anti-pornography movement-that is a specialized market, even
among straight men. But if the theory cannot explain what is wrong with
the great bulk of ordinary, non-violent pornography then it is of little
use to the feminist cause. The explanation that older feminism proposed

York: Meridian Books, 1991) 248. See also Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing
Women (New York: Dutton, 1989) at 56-62.
47 Piet Hein, "Dream Interpretation: Simplified" in Grooks, vol. 1 (Toronto: General
Publishing Company Limited, 1969) at 12.
48 See Rae Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts" (1993) 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 293;
Jennifer Hornsby, "Speech Acts and Pornography" in Susan Dwyer, ed., The Problem of
Pornography(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995) 220 at 224. Langton is inspired by some passing
remarks of MacKinhion's.
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was that this too is harmful, because to be photographed as an object for
the male gaze is already to be objectified and therefore to be made
available for other kinds of abuse. Here again, analytic feminists took
the lead, demonstrating the context-dependent and multi-valent
character of "objectification." 49 Whether it is bad to be treated as an
object depends on who is doing the treating and on what the object isit is one thing for a bed-mate to treat you as a pillow, another for a bedmate to treat you as a doormat.
These theories raise questions about how smoothly the analysis
of heterosexual pornography carries over to the homosexual case. The
norm-dependent account of subordination suggests that we need to
attend to what the prevailing norms of sexual conduct actually are in
lesbian and gay contexts, to what norms are expressed in or supported
by their pornographic materials, and to what authority those materials
enjoy. In the heterosexual case, pornography is said to recapitulate,
secure, and legitimate the already subordinate position of women in a
sexist society. In a heterosexist society, gay people are subordinate to
straight people, but it is far from clear what gay pornography has to do
with that, in part because the oppressor class, if that is what it is, doesn't
seem to be much influenced by gay pornography. Similar doubts arise
about objectification. "All women live in sexual objectification the way
fish live in water."5 Do gay men swim in the same pond? Is the typical
image of a gay man in our society that of a sex object? We are not
exactly surrounded by sexualized images of gay men being used to sell
everything from breath mints to sports cars. What difference any of this
makes is open to argument," but it does make it hard to feel confident
in simply applying the old theories unmodified.
One way of dealing with the mismatch between the oppressor
class and the consumers of gay pornography is hinted at in Kendall's

4 See Sally Haslanger, "On Being Objective and Being Objectified" in Louise M. Antony
& Charlotte Witt, eds., A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993) 85; Martha Nussbaum, "Objectification" (1995) 24 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 249.
'oMacKinnon, Feminist Theory,supra note 16 at 149.
in Leslie Green, "Pornographizing,
-' Some points about the former are considered
Subordinating, and Silencing" in Robert Post, ed., Censorshipand Silencing: Practicesof Cultural
Regulation (Los Angeles, CA: Getty Research Institute, 1998) 285. For a discussion of
objectification, see Leslie Green, "Pornographies" (2000) 8 J. of Pol. Phil. 27.
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discussion of the American case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.52
Joseph Oncale was subjected to horrific on-the-job sexual harassment
and abuse by other men. The question was whether he, a
(presumptively) straight man could sue other (presumptively) straight
men under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
employment discrimination "because of ... sex." The court said he
could. What does this have to do with obscenity law? Kendall is aware
that there is no evidence that any of the men who oppressed Oncale had
ever seen, let alone been influenced by, gay pornography. But we might
think of it this way: Gay pornography supports a masculinist culture as
proved by the gender-reductionist argument. That culture makes
possible the kinds of humiliation and abuse that Oncale was made to
suffer on the job. If we ban gay pornography, we weaken one of the
supports of that culture, and make it less likely that the Oncales of the
world will suffer sex discrimination at the hands of other men. The link
is a tenuous one. And we should be a little cautious in accepting the idea
that anything that supports a masculinist culture is a candidate for
criminalization: that charge has been frequently laid at the door of male
homosexuality itself; and it is plausibly laid at the door of many world
religions.
On one point, Oncale consorts more closely with the arguments
of LEAF and Egale in Little Sisters than Kendall has noticed. Justice
Scalia writes,
In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful consideration of
the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target. A
professional football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive,
for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if
the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary,
(male or female) back at the office.53

There are things to worry about in this decision,54 but that
observation seems sound: what a smack on the buttocks amounts to
depends on the whole social context. The same applies to a picture of a

52523 U.S. 75 (1998) [Oncalej.
53

Ibid.at 81.
The equality-affirming aspect of the decision was somewhat spoiled by Justice Scalia's
further assertion that Title VII gives no remedy for run-of-the-mill sexism: the statute "does not
reach genuine but innocuous differences in ways men and women routinely interact with members
of same sex and of opposite sex .... Ibid.at 75.
'
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smack on the buttocks. But that is just the core objection to a genderreductionist analysis of gay male pornography. Kendall asks what it does
55
to a person to kneel to perform sex for a camera. Forget the camera
for a moment, and ask: what does it do to a person to kneel to perform
sex? Someone who had absorbed the lesson of Oncale should answer: it
depends. It depends on whether it is a person kneeling freely or being
forced. It depends on what sort of sex act is being performed. And, it
may also depend on whether the kneeler is male or female.
In Little Sisters, the bookstore, LEAF, and Egale all argued that
various aspects of the lesbian and gay context could be expected to
modify the harmfulness of certain materials. It is wrong to understand
this, as the Court did, as requesting a "general exemption" for gay
pornography, a sort of free pass in spite of its harmfulness. It is also
wrong to suppose, as Kendall does, that it holds that "the production of
same-sex pornography should be exempt from legal regulation because
'56
harms cannot result from it." That would be a preposterous view. If
people are enslaved, or exploited, or hurt in the production of gay
pornography, or if people are forced to view or read it, then harm
results just as surely as it does in the heterosexual case. Of course,
neither section 163 nor judicial doctrine limits obscenity to just those
circumstances (which are in any case unlawful on other grounds). The
fair interpretation of the argument is simply this: by the very standards
the Court articulated in Butler, gay materials will sometimes merit a
different conclusion than would otherwise similar heterosexual
materials, and the rules of thumb set out in the tripartite scheme ought
to reflect this.
That does not seem like such a strange idea in light of the
insistent emphasis in Butler on the way pornography's harm is bound up
with inequality between the sexes. Kendall accepts that understanding of
Butler, and tries to show how sex inequality persists through the absence
of sexual difference. Pressed to consider the relevance of context, the
Supreme Court veered off in a rather surprising direction: "Violence
against women was only one of several concerns, albeit an important
one, that led to the formulation of the Butler harm-based test, which

I Supra note 1 at 168.
56

Ibid. at 70 [emphasis added].
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itself is gender neutral."5 7 Who would have predicted that after adopting
so much of the gender-essentialist view of pornography in Butler the
Court would later conclude that gender has nothing to do with it?
Kendall is certainly not tempted by that view. For him, sexuality
is centrally about gender. There is a modest and an extreme version of
that idea. The modest thesis is that homophobia and sexism are
mutually supporting vices. Sometimes it seems that that is all Kendall
wants to argue, for example, when he says, "I query ...how one can
advocate for the eradication of homophobia without first understanding
the role of sex discrimination in our society ....
"58 He is right about that.
For one thing, different forms of discrimination have lots in common,
and the origins and scope of sexism make it a good primer. Work at
understanding the ways, overt and covert, in which men discriminate
against women, and the illusions and superstitions by which they
legitimate it, and you will have a good model for understanding the ways
that straight women and men discriminate against gay people.
Moreover, there is a substantive connection between sexism and
homophobia. One way of being homophobic is to regard gay men as
feminized by their sexuality, and to hate them for it.
Sexism is thus part of the picture. But is it all there is? Or is it
the main thing? That would be a more extreme thesis. The gender
reductionism on which that view rests underestimates one of the most
interesting things about modern lesbian and gay sexualities: the extent
to which they have escaped the nineteenth-century idea that sexual
variation is a kind of gender inversion, a "hermaphrodism of the soul,"
as Foucault memorably put it. 9 The history of that transformation has
yet to be told, but it marks one of the most important distinctions
between lesbian and gay sexualities as we now have them and many
earlier ones. Unconventional masculinity is no longer necessarily
interpreted as femininity; it is now subject to being deplored in its own
right. That being so, the centre of gravity of homophobia has shifted
somewhat. The specific character of sexuality injustice is now better

'i'ttle
Sisters, supra note 6 at 1164.
58

Supra note 1 at 41.
s Michel Foucault, A History of Sexuality, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage
Books, 1990) vol. 1 at 43.
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understood as what Cheshire Calhoun calls pseudonymity6°: access to
the public sphere is conditioned on pretending to be something other
than what one is, on condition of remaining closeted. In a queer way,
the gender-reductionist view of gay male pornography collaborates in
this. To think that gay male pornography is nothing but straight
pornography using men in the place of women is to enact this
pseudonymity within the theory. Of course there is nothing wrong with
taking the gender story just as far as we can, no more than there is in
trying to get a class-based analysis to do as much work as it can in
understanding the persistent injustices between men and women. But to
miss the specific character of sexuality injustice, and the ways it comes to
bear on our thinking about pornography, is to miss an important part of
the picture.
V.
The sex discrimination theory of pornography began its life as an
attack on obscenity laws. Feminists argued that such laws were not only
misguided, but wrong: "Obscenity law helps keep pornography sexy by
putting state power-force, hierarchy-behind its purported prohibition
on what men can have sexual access to."61 In Butler this trenchant
critique of obscenity laws was somehow co-opted in their defence: the
rejection of moralism and the insistence on a gendered analysis of harm
became reasons for upholding obscenity laws rather than replacing
them. The most that Dworkin and MacKinnon ever gave by way of
justification for this about-face was this: "We are encouraged ... that the
Butler decision under Canada's new Chartermakes it likely that our civil
rights law against pornography would be found constitutional if passed
there."62 But that is no more persuasive than saying that it would be
encouraging for the courts to uphold criminal prohibitions on
blasphemy, since that would demonstrate their readiness to uphold civil
remedies for libel.
Kendall seems ambivalent on this point. He makes frequent
mention of the vices of obscenity laws, and he understands well why

6 Cheshire Calhoun, Feminism, The Family, and the Politics of the Closet Lesbian and
Gay Displacement(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 75-106.
6 MacKinnon, Feminist Theory, supra note 16 at 214.
62

MacKinnon & Dworkin, supra note 45.
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MacKinnon originally opposed them. At the same time, he seems to
treat them as complementary rather than competing cures for the evils
he identifies. The problem in Canada was the one-track approach: "The
Glad Day decision ... made apparent the problems inherent in an antipornography approach that relies solely on the criminal courts for
enforcement."63 In an unstable compromise, his final suggestion is that
we add to the criminal apparatus mechanisms for educating and training
those charged with deploying it and, in due course, an ordinance-style
system of civil remedies for those who have been provably harmed.
To her enormous credit, Dworkin always refused to collaborate
of thinking. She opposed LEAF's position in Butler; she
sort
in this
6
vigorously continued to reject all criminal prohibitions on obscenity. At
the same time, however, her argument gave only a negative case for
freedom of sexual expression. To show what is wrong with repression is
not to show what is of positive value in the liberty itself. Nor does
Kendall help us much with this question. Perhaps he feels no need to
address it, having created for himself opponents who oppose criminal
obscenity law because they are in favour of pornography. His imagined
of
production and distribution
"support the
interlocutors
6 5 ; they are "pro-pornography advocates" 66 in a "propornography"
pornography crusade."67 This is either a rhetorical excess (and, by the
end of the book, a wearying one) or it is the mark of an elementary
mistake. One need not support pornography in order to oppose criminal
restrictions on it, still less the particular restrictions of the Criminal
Code as they have been construed by the Canadian courts. Compare
other familiar liberty rights. One can favour legal protection for a
woman's right to choose and yet think that abortion is normally
regrettable or even wrong. One can oppose restrictions on the
publication of the Bible or Koran while thinking them handbooks for
the oppression of women and gays. One can even believe that people
have a right to engage in homosexual conduct while thinking it sinful.
Similarly, a critique of obscenity laws does not depend on anything like

63 Supra note 1 at 169 [emphasis added].
64
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the view that pornography is good. The sensible attitude to take towards
pornography itself is surely one of ambivalence: what value it has comes
part and parcel with its vices. But to assess the matter only in these
terms is already to pitch it at the wrong level of abstraction. It is to
repeat the mistake of the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick, who scorned
the idea that there could be a "fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy."6 8 As Justice Blackmun replied in dissent,
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy," as
the Court purports to declare, than Stanley v. Georgiawas about a fundamental right to
watch obscene movies ... . Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men," namely, "the right to be let alone."69

The question we need to address is not what is the value of
pornography,, but rather, what is the value of those liberties whose reach
is broad enough to protect (some of) its uses.
When MacKinnon and Stoltenberg wrote, it was largely under
the assumption that the liberty at stake was of value only as a means to
bodily pleasure: on one side we had women's equality, on the other
men's orgasms. A similar attitude is evident in Justice Sopinka's
judgment. He writes, "[T]his kind of expression lies far from the core of
the guarantee of freedom of expression. It appeals only to the most base
aspect of individual fulfilment ... ."70 It is a fair question why one should
regard any form of sexual fulfillment as "base." But we must also ask
why anyone would think that sexual fulfillment is all that is at stake here.
Contemporary writers, like the intervenors in Little Sisters, are apt to see
values of authenticity, identity, and even community at stake in
censorship. One does not have to think that pornography itself is the
means through which the true self is recovered, identities explored, or
relationships and institutions built. One need only suppose that a
generous portion of liberty, including a liberty of expression broad
enough to protect' many sorts of pornography, is crucial. This will have
wider ramifications. Societies in which sexual liberty flourishes come to
look a lot more like London or Toronto than they do like Riyadh or
Tehran. Where there is sexual liberty, men and women mix and flirt in
public; they discuss their loves and their lusts; public displays of

68478 U.S. 186 at 199 (1986).
69
Ibid.[internal citations omitted].
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affection are common; it is normal to bring a date to the high school
prom or a mate to the office party. When all that happens, however, the
stakes for sexual minorities change dramatically. In a sexually private
culture everyone is equally in the closet; in sexually open societies, the
balance shifts. Greater openness makes sexual minorities more aware of
their difference, because it makes it salient in so many more contexts. In
familiar ways this helps consolidate minority identities. Liberty, we
might say, produces sexual minorities who then need more liberty if they
are to shape their lives according to their needs. The liberties in
question include those that enable sexual minorities to make their way
in a highly sexualized public culture. These are not (or not usually) the
gifts of pornography itself, but they are the gifts of an expressive liberty
that goes so far as to encompass pornography. They are what is at risk in
any regime of censorship and prior restraint; we know that risk can
materialize, because we have watched it happen.

